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Abstract: Previous research, notably Baumol (1990), has highlighted the role of insti-
tutions in channeling entrepreneurial supply into productive, unproductive or destruc-
tive activities. However, entrepreneurship is not only influenced by institutions—
entrepreneurs often help shape institutions themselves. The bilateral causal relation 
between entrepreneurs and institutions is examined in this paper. Entrepreneurs affect 
institutions in at least three ways. Entrepreneurship abiding by existing institutions is 
occasionally disruptive enough to challenge the foundations of prevailing institutions. 
Entrepreneurs sometimes have the opportunity to evade institutions, which tends to 
undermine the effectiveness of the institutions, or cause institutions to change for the 
better. Lastly, entrepreneurs can directly alter institutions through innovative political 
entrepreneurship. Like business entrepreneurship, innovative political activity may be 
productive or unproductive, depending on the incentives facing entrepreneurs.  
 
JEL Codes: L5; M13; O31; P14. 
 





Research Institute of Industrial  
Economics (IFN) 
2Harris School of Public Policy 
University of Chicago 
Box 55665  1155 East 60
th Street 
SE-102 15 Stockholm  60637 Chicago IL 
Phone: +46-8-665 45 00   
Fax: +46-8-665 45 99   
e-mail:  magnus.henrekson@ifn.se   tino@uchicago.edu  
 
                                                 
* This paper builds on work that originally included Robin Douhan as a key contributor. Robin unexpectedly and 
tragically passed away on 10 August 2009. His death, at the age of 31, was caused by sudden heart failure. His 
friendship, kindness and talent are deeply missed. Our profound intellectual debt to Robin is hereby acknow-
leged. Financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Research Foundation and from the Gustaf 
Douglas Research Program on Entrepreneurship at IFN is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful for useful 
comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper from Johan Almenberg, William Baumol, Selva 
Baziki, Niclas Berggren, Pete Boettke, Dan Johansson, Linda Nyberg and two anonymous referees.   1 
1. Introduction 
It has been recognized for some time that institutions shape the actions of entrepreneurs (e.g., 
Parker, 2004, ch. 3). Yet Baumol‘s seminal work (1990) contributed to the literature by show-
ing that institutions determine not only the level, but also the type of entrepreneurship. Indi-
viduals put their entrepreneurial talent to use in activities that are productive, unproductive or 
destructive. The institutional setup or ―the rules of the game‖ dictate relative return, and hence 
the allocation across these activities. However, institutions do not merely control entrepre-
neurs, entrepreneurs control them—through business activity, evasive methods and political 
entrepreneurship. This paper will explore both sides of this interaction: how the institutional 
framework influences entrepreneurship and how entrepreneurs in turn influence the emer-
gence and evolution of institutions.  
 
An influential stream of research has built on the insight that productive abilities can also be 
used for rent-extracting purposes (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991, and Acemoglu 
1995). This literature typically stresses that institutions determine the relative rates of return 
of productive and unproductive types of activities. This relationship has typically been as-
sumed to be unilateral, running from institutions to entrepreneurship, while a potential reverse 
or bilateral causality has been largely neglected.
1  
 
Yet entrepreneurship does interact with institutions within the course of a  bilateral relation-
ship. This possibility has been touched upon previously in the public choice school. Buchanan 
(1980, p. 14) noted:  
Faced with a prospect of differentially unfavorable tax treatment by government, a person or a 
group may (1) engage in lobbying effort; (2) engage directly in politics to secure access to deci-
sion-making power, and/or (3) make plans to shift into or out of the affected activity.  
In general terms, Buchanan concludes that entrepreneurs affect institutions by: (i) market in-
novations that alter institutions or the effect of institutions; (ii) evasion of institutions; and (iii) 
direct political entrepreneurship.  
 
                                                 
1 Boettke and Coyne (2009) thoroughly analyze the link between institutions and entrepreneurship (and also 
offer a comprehensive review of the related literature). Boettke and Coyne (2003) probably contains the strong-
est assertion that institutions are the ultimate cause of growth, whereas entrepreneurship is merely a proximate 
cause, since according to them its supply and direction is fully determined by the institutional setup.   2 
2. Entrepreneurship Defined and Categorized 
2.1 Entrepreneurial Talent 
In line with Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991), an entrepreneur is defined here accord-
ing to a set of talents. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the nature of these tal-
ents; some scholars  emphasize cognitive abilities while others point to motivation (prefe-
rences).
2 We define entrepreneurial talent  as a combination of perceptiveness, the ability to 
detect opportunities, and the capability of undertaking new ventures in respon se. The defini-
tion thus includes both motivation and ability. Profitable business projects, the chance to ap-
propriate or earn rents and the possibility to affect policy constitute the opportunities explored 
here. 
 
Self-employment and start-ups embody the most typical forms of business entrepreneurship. 
Our definition of entrepreneurship precludes many forms of self-employment, however. Most 
importantly, self-employment that is not innovative in nature does not qualify as entrepr e-
neurship.  In reality,  no clear boundary delineating truly innovative entrepreneurship from 
non-innovative self-employment can be drawn; as a result, we employ a continuum of self-
employment activity organized from purely non-innovative to highly dynamic entrepreneur-
ship.  
 
The idea that innovative individuals contribute to institutional change has a long history in 
political science. In his case study of political power in New Haven, Dahl (1961) introduced 
the term ―political entrepreneurs,‖ individuals who recombine resources in the policy arena to 
bring about change. The political arena in New Haven was entrepreneurial in its alertness to 
―citizen desires‖ and ―the ease with which the political stratum can be penetrated‖ (Dahl 
1961, p. 93) by new individuals. In accordance with political scientists, we also call entrepre-
neurship undertaken with the direct aim of altering institutions political entrepreneurship.
3 
                                                 
2 Research on typical entrepreneurial properties focus on two major themes: cognitive abilities and motivation. 
The model entrepreneur is someone who is alert to opportunities. Cognitively, this amounts to efficiently struc-
turing abundant information in order to make feasible judgments (Gaglio and Katz, 2001). It also involves a 
capacity to think in novel ways (Ward, 2004). In regard to motives, the longest standing characterization of an 
entrepreneur is associated with the need to achieve and create (Weber, 2001[1905]; McClelland, 1961). Further-
more, an entrepreneur exhibits a willingness to take calculated (but not necessarily calculable) risks. Knight 
(1921) claims that the ability to cope with uncertainty is the main function of entrepreneurship. For a survey of 
empirical evidence on these motivational aspects, see Rausch and Frese (2000). These properties are consistent 
with the historical accounts in Schumpeter (1934) and Kirzner (1973, 1992). 
3 Van der Steen and Groenewegen (2009) distinguish between political entrepreneurship, institutional entrepre-
neurship and policy entrepreneurship. In order to avoid an overabundance of definitions, we use political, institu-
tional and policy entrepreneurship interchangeably.     3 
The term business or market entrepreneur is used here, somewhat loosely, to refer to tradi-
tional Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, distinct from political entrepreneurs. Similar to business 
entrepreneurs,  political entrepreneurs are  people who are  alert to opportunities,  bear risk, 
reorganize coalitions and resources, and ultimately bring about innovation, be it socially posi-
tive or negative. 
 
Despite clear differences in undertakings and goals, business and policy entrepreneurs enjoy 
similar functions. Law-abiding business entrepreneurs and institution-altering political entre-
preneurs both discover and meet unfulfilled needs, and both must bear the personal risk asso-
ciated with their ventures. Lastly, all entrepreneurs need to coordinate and reorganize the re-
sources needed to undertake change, be it capital, labor or political alliances. In light of these 
parallel functions, it is likely that all types of entrepreneurs share at least some individual cha-
racteristics. 
 
Lee Kuan Yew, Robert Mugabe and Silvio Berlusconi are some of the major political entre-
preneurs discussed here. While they are quite obvious examples, Lee, Mugabe and Berlusconi 
only form the tip of the iceberg of political entrepreneurship. Innovative political activity oc-
curs constantly on all levels of government.  Similar to business entrepreneurship, the most 
iconic figures become national heroes, although most political entrepreneurship is local and 
small-scale.  Societal  factors such as demographic change and technological  development  
drive the need for such activity. For example, the expansion of a suburb entails new roads and 
public services, and the individual who identifies and responds to this need is the political 
entrepreneur. Schneider  et al. (1995) focus on community entrepreneurs, who organize to 
provide local public goods. They find that thirty percent of city clerks in suburban American 
counties could identify an individual in their community whose ―policy proposals and politi-
cal position represented a dynamic change from existing procedures‖. Again, akin to business 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial individuals often start out as small-scale local political entre-
preneurs who expand the scope of their activity if successful. Current U.S. president Barack 
Obama famously started his political career as a ―community organizer‖ in Chicago.  
 
Of  course,  all  political  leaders  share  some  entrepreneurial  aspects.  Virtually  all  of  them 
change statutes, introduce new legislation, or carry through reforms at some point during their 
careers. One would be hard-pressed to find any long-serving politician who has not contri-
buted to at least some minor institutional change. Does that mean that all politicians are polit-  4 
ical entrepreneurs  then? Not necessarily; policy entrepreneurship is not alone in suffering 
from this problem of delineation. Almost  every firm or public institution engages in some 
degree of innovation and alertness in its day-to-day activities. All economic activity involves 
a minimum degree of entrepreneurship, regardless of how entrepreneurship is defined (Kirz-
ner 2009). Economic entrepreneurship—whether explicit or implicit—can be seen as a matter 
of degree. Changing the color of a product is not enough; an activity must be sufficiently in-
novative for it to be defined as entrepreneurial and made distinct from non-entrepreneurial 
activity. The same is true for political entrepreneurship; institutional reform has to be suffi-
ciently novel for it to qualify as policy entrepreneurship. Where one chooses to draw the line 
depends on context and the researcher‘s own judgment.  
 
2.2 Institutional Entrepreneurs in Sociology 
The  fundamental  concept  of  institutional  entrepreneurship  in  sociological  literature  is  the 
same as  the one discussed here, although its framing and perspective are different  (Scott 
2004). In this rich literature, institutions appear as deeper and firmer aspects of social struc-
tures. Scott writes, for example, that (1995, p. 33) ―institutions are social structures that have 
attained a high degree of resilience. [They] are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, 
and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stabili-
ty and meaning to social life.‖ Institutional entrepreneurship can ―account for institutional 
change endogenously‖ (Battilana 2006). DiMaggio (1988)
4 introduced this function to explain 
how individuals can bring about radical change not necessarily in line with prevailing institu-
tions.  
 
Prior to DiMaggio, prevailing sociological theory could only explain institutional change in 
terms of isomorphism (organizations spreading their rules of behavior) ; it had difficulty ac-
counting for situations in which dramatic change takes place in the opposite direction of in i-
tial institutional inertia, such as a rapid shift in the market structure or the fact of a mature 
firm suddenly changing its core business and strategy . Other types of discontinuous change 
also represented something of a puzzle to this theory. ―How can organizations or individuals 
innovate if their beliefs and actions are all determined by the very instructional environment 
they wish to change?‖ (Battilana 2006, p. 654). The paradox is to some extent resolved by 
                                                 
4 Rather, this constitutes one school of entrepreneurship in sociology. For a seminal sociological treatment of 
market entrepreneurship, see Swedberg (2000). Hwang and Powell (2005) survey the neoinstitutional literature 
on institutional entrepreneurship.    5 
introducing the entrepreneur. This allows for the capacity of agents to ―make a difference,‖ 
acting sometimes contrary to what the prevailing institutional structure would predict, and 
even change these prevailing institutions.  
 
The sociological perspective that builds on DiMaggio‘s institutional entrepreneur coincides in 
part with the economic and political science definition of institutions, namely informal institu-
tions such as norms and culture. Discontinuous change of institutions through individual ac-
tions fits well with the idea of political entrepreneurs altering institutions. The sociological 
view of structures and institutions, which is reinforced every time individuals act in line with 
them, resembles most economists‘ definition of habits and hardwired preferences (Becker and 
Murphy 2000).  
 
In contrast to sociologists, economists fail to see a paradox in the fact of entrepreneurs being 
influenced by institutions at the same time as they contribute to institutional change and evo-
lution. Nor do economists recognize agents being ―trapped‖ in institutions, requiring entre-
preneurs to  escape. This  reflects  sociologists‘  much broader definition of institutions  and 
structures,  including most  beliefs and preferences. (Sociologists  view these institutions  as 
stronger and more binding, and comparatively more important than economic incentives or 
relative prices.) Ultimately, this difference in perspective mirrors the classical disagreement 
between sociologists and economists regarding the extent individuals are free to make choices 
and control their own circumstances. Nevertheless, since sociologists allow for entrepreneurs 
to escape their structural bonds while economists emphasize the role of broad institutions and 
social context in forming individual choice in this area, the two disciplines are closer to each 
other regarding institutional entrepreneurship than on many other issues.  
 
2.3 Entrepreneurship – A Typology 
In our analysis, we follow Baumol‘s lead (1990) in distinguishing between productive and 
unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship.
5 Due to differences in focus, however, we do not 
discriminate between destructive and merely unproductive entrepreneurship,  choosing rather 
to merge the two categories. Our attention is directed rather at entrepreneurs‘ response to in-
stitutions. Entrepreneurs can abide by institutions, and later even evade institutions. Finally 
                                                 
5 Sobel (2008) finds empirical support for Baumol‘s theory. Unproductive entrepreneurship is effort spent on the 
redistribution of wealth rather than the creation of additional wealth, whereas destructive entrepreneurship is not 
only redistributive but also reduces total wealth.    6 
we include the possibility for entrepreneurs to alter institutions. This creates a 2 x 3 matrix, 
where each entrepreneurial activity can be assigned to one of the six types. 
 
Baumol (1990) introduces his analysis as an extension of Schumpeter‘s (1934) theory of in-
novations as new combinations, particularly when discussing productive entrepreneurship.
6 
Innovative entrepreneurship may be, and often is, incremental in nature, progressing in small 
steps over long periods. The same is true for political entrepreneurship.  
 
Unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship, on the other hand, entails some combination of 
rent-seeking technologies that enables the entrepreneur to appropriate rents from other agents. 
In this process, the social product may be unaffected, as in the case of a simple transfer, or be 
lowered, as in the case of destructive entrepreneurship. In the terminology of the neoclassical 
theory of the firm, the distinction between the different types can be characterized as a shift 
inward (destructive) or outward (productive) of the production possibility frontier (Coyne and 
Leeson 2004). 
 
Given the definition of the entrepreneur, it simply cannot be assumed that entrepreneurs pas-
sively respond to institutions. Indeed, theories within the school of new institutional econom-
ics usually describe the entrepreneur as a key agent in institutional change. North (1990), for 
instance, holds that the entrepreneur acts on the fringe of a given institutional setup and is the 
agent that embodies dynamism and change, all occurring in a setting in which agents‘ beha-
vior is otherwise determined by institutions. This is broadly consistent with the framework 
presented here. A second dimension of our typology distinguishes behavior within the con-
straints of the institutions from behavior aimed at evading these constraints. Evasive entrepre-
neurship is defined as an activity aimed at circumventing the institutional framework. Finally, 
entrepreneurs may actively alter institutions through political activity. These definitions are 
illustrated in Figure 1.
7  
 
                                                 
6 Productive business entrepreneurship can entail: (i) introduction of a new good (or a new quality of a good); (ii) 
introduction of a new method of production; (iii) opening of a new market; (iv) conquest of a new source of 
supply of raw materials or semi-manufactured goods; or (v) implementation of a new organizational form. One 
can summarize these points as new combinations of resources and technology on the market that create positive 
social value. 
7 As will be discussed, both abiding and evading entrepreneurship can have the unintentional result of changing 
institutions. Altering entrepreneurship differs in that it is direct, and more importantly, that the aim is to change 
institutions.   7 
The allocation of entrepreneurship between abiding, evading and altering institutions is influ-
enced by the relative payoff of those activities,  much like the allocation between productive 
and unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990). It is important to keep the ver-
tical distinctions in Figure 1 (from productive to unproductive/destructive) separate from the 
horizontal ones (choosing to follow a career as an abiding business entrepreneur, an evasive 
[legal or illegal] entrepreneur or an altering political entrepreneur).  
 
  ABIDE  EVADE  ALTER 
PRODUCTIVE 
Pursue a business 
opportunity within pre-
vailing institutions. 
Sidestep stifling labor 
market regulations 
through a new  
contractual form. 
Provide a new local 
public good, private 
security firms.  
UNPRODUCTIVE/ 
DESTRUCTIVE 
Sue competitors for a 
share of their profit. 
Rogue states; rivalry 
between warlords. 
Bribe a government 
official to obtain a con-
tract. Illegal syndicates. 
Lobby for a new regula-
tion to protect an indus-
try. Repeal property 
rights to plunder a  
wealthy group. 
Figure 1. A Typology of Entrepreneurship and Some Illustrative Examples. 
 
Baumol only discusses business entrepreneurs as productive entrepreneurship, whereas other 
entrepreneurial activities (such as joining the bureaucracy) are discussed solely in unproduc-
tive terms. In our categorization, both institution-abiding business entrepreneurship and insti-
tution-altering political entrepreneurship can be productive. Even evasive entrepreneurship 
can be productive, both directly (by evading institutions that hamper production) and indirect-
ly (by forcing a change in such institutions). This is not based in a disagreement with Baumol; 
rather, it merely arises from our including two categories—evading and altering entrepreneur-
ship—that he did not.
8  
 
In practice, however, not all  activity can be neatly categorized by our definitions. Entrepr e-
neurship may incorporate aspects of evasion and alteration at the same time, for example, 
such as the organization of boycotts and passive resistance in order to change a law.  The ma-
                                                 
8 Baumol (1990) focused mainly on the allocation of entrepreneurial talent, rather than the supply of entrepre-
neurship (although he did not rule out the possibility that the supply of entrepreneurship could also be affected). 
We believe institutions can strongly affect the total supply of entrepreneurship, as will be exemplified below. In 
Henrekson and Sanandaji (2010), for example, we discuss how institutions governing taxation affect the supply 
of entrepreneurial effort. See also Asoni and Sanandaji (2009).   8 
trix aims solely to give some structure to the discussion, and does not claim perfect and mu-
tually exclusive categorization.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that institutions that direct talent to different activities do not nec-
essarily affect exactly the same individuals. If the rules of the game in a country change in 
favor of business entrepreneurship, a successful influence peddler does not automatically be-
come  an industrialist. Rather,  when an  individual drops  out of political entrepreneurship, 
room is made for another individual with abilities suited for building productive firms. 
 
3. Entrepreneurship Across Different Activities 
3.1 The Politico-Economic Approach 
Bilateral causal effects between politics, institutions and economic performance have long 
captured the interest of economists. Baumol (1990) asserts that institutions determine ―the 
social structure of payoffs‖, which govern the conduct of economic activity. Institutions have 
moved to the fore of mainstream explanations for economic performance, especially over the 
long term; see, for example, North and Weingast (1989), Rodrik et al. (2004), and Acemoglu 
et al. (2005). On the macro level, some studies empirically identify the effects of economic 
performance on political institutions (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999, and Chong and Calderón 
2000).  
 
Certain economic institutions possess particular importance for entrepreneurship, including 
property rights, tax codes, social insurance systems, labor market legislation, competition pol-
icy, trade policies, capital market regulation, enforcement of contracts, and law and order 
(Hall and Jones 1999). A constitution is a prime example of an economically significant polit-
ical institution because of its implications for voting systems, for example, and directives con-
trolling  a  country‘s  degree  of  centralization  and  federalism  (Persson  and  Tabellini  2004, 
2006). Institutions are both formal and informal, and can in both cases be affected by entre-
preneurs.
9 It is much easier to alter formal institutions through political activ ity than change 
informal rules such as norms, values and codes of conduct.  
                                                 
9 For an in-depth discussion of formal and informal institutions and how they pertain to entrepreneurship, see 
Boettke and Coyne (2009).    9 
3.2 Abiding Entrepreneurship 
The abiding market entrepreneur is the archetypical entrepreneur, the one most discussed in 
the literature. Productive business entrepreneurship increases an economy‘s degree of innova-
tion and its ability to adapt to exogenous conditions. Innovativeness forms the core of Schum-
peter‘s (1934) entrepreneur who disturbs the existing equilibrium, whereas Kirzner‘s (1973, 
1992) entrepreneur is marked by the ability to adapt.
10 While productive entrepreneurship is 
important in all economies, the need for adaptation and innovativeness depends on the exte r-
nal environment. For instance, in times of rapid change, driven for example by a high rate of 
technological progress or new supplies of resources, adaptability becomes paramount.
11  
 
The relationship between abiding entrepreneurship and the evolution of institutions is co m-
plex. On the one hand, truly innovative entrepreneurship can create so much change that the 
foundation of the current institutional structure is challenged.  Truly disruptive entrepreneur-
ship, such as the successful introduction of a revolutionary new technology, can lead to  the 
reform and dissolution of extant institutions, notably in traditional  societies. Technological 
progress can also alter the effect of institutions; one salient and recent example is the impact 
of the Internet on intellectual property rights. 
 
On the other hand, entrepreneurship can be self-perpetuating. It creates a constituency of con-
sumers, private-sector workers and self-employed who support productive institutions. Tech-
nological breakthroughs often offer opportunities for new entrepreneurship, both  of the mar-
ket and political type. No less importantly, productive entrepreneurship legitimates the institu-
tions that foster it by creating demonstrable new wealth, products and jobs.  The American 
economic system, with its high degree of  inequality coupled with the opportunity to grow 
fabulously rich, has maintained its legitimacy largely because entrepreneurs from Andrew 
Carnegie to Bill Gates have created new value that has benefited the general  public (Acs and 
Phillips 2002)). Furthermore, entrepreneurs (and non-entrepreneurs) abiding by institutions 
tend to strengthen these very institutions. This is particularly important for informal instit u-
tions, such as codes of conduct and traditions, which are reinforced  each time they are ac-
                                                 
10 See Baumol (2010), Holcombe (2007) and Yu (2001) for discussions of these two aspects and how they can be 
combined in the same system. See also Kirzner (2009) for a critical assessment of such merging.  
11 It could be noted that abiding entrepreneurship is not limited to market or business entrepreneurship. The non-
profit sector is a sizable share of the economy in countries such as the United States, and includes a large amount 
of productive non-market entrepreneurship. Boettke and Coyne (2009) further discuss social entrepreneurship 
and its relation to institutions. Compared to market entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship is more likely to be 
a combination of abiding and altering activity towards institutions.    10 
knowledged and allowed to guide behavior. Regarding more formal institutions it has been 
noted that the law itself derives much of its value from the respect that it is awarded (Kasper 
and Streit 1998). Becker and Murphy (2000) use the neoclassical economic framework to 
argue that institutions are reinforced through abiding behavior. They use the U.S. constitution 
as an example of an institution whose rules have been strengthened as Americans throughout 
history have followed its guiding principles. In contrast, similar constitutions in other cou n-
tries, notably in Latin America, have been weakened over time as each violation of its prin-
ciples has reduced people‘s respect for the constitution and tradition.  
3.3 Evasive Entrepreneurship  
In the case of evasive entrepreneurship, the activities of the entrepreneur do not alter the for-
mal institutional set-up but rather the impact of institutions already in place. Imperfections in 
the institutional framework can be used innovatively to appropriate rents from a third party, 
exemplified well by the shortcomings in the protection of private property rights. Agents may 
act on such institutional flaws by outright theft, fraud, litigation or more sophisticated eco-
nomic crimes. Productive examples include entrepreneurs who pursue contractual arrange-
ments to escape some costly institution. Tax avoidance (legal) and tax evasion (illegal) are 
typical examples. A business-owning entrepreneur may engage in such evasive entrepreneur-
ship  to  reduce costs, while other entrepreneurs, notably  within  tax consultancies and law 
firms, may found a new business based on an innovation that enables others to circumvent 
institutional barriers. While illegal and harmful for public finances, tax evasion can be pro-
ductive if the economic activity in question would not take place without such evasion. 
 
Other, more mundane, instances of this type include the businessman who uses his entrepre-
neurial talent to trace the right bureaucrat to approach with a bribe. In the simplest case, this 
constitutes an instance of evasive entrepreneurship. One can think of yet more elaborate situa-
tions where the entrepreneur earns money by selling services all while utilizing knowledge of 
bureaucratic procedures or personal acquaintances. The bureaucrat who receives the bribe can 
also act entrepreneurially, by increasing the cost of abiding by the institutions, for instance. 
 
Evasive entrepreneurship can be productive or unproductive depending on the circumstances. 
If a business activity would not have taken place at all without the said circumvention of laws, 
it may be that the evasive actions are indeed productive. Other times, the evasion of institu-
tions results in a waste of resources (such as costly cross-border smuggling, rather than regu-  11 
lar bulk import). More obvious examples of destructive evasive entrepreneurship include pre-
datory (innovative) criminal activity.  
 
Evasive behavior by entrepreneurs, including the creation of contracts to overcome instit u-
tional impediments, tends to weaken the institutions that are being evaded. A formal institu-
tion that is not enforced is likely to lose its practical relevance. The pursuance of new contrac-
tual arrangements in order to evade labor regulations provides another example of this process 
As evasion spreads, regulations lose some of their bite, and may in time be abolished if not 
modified to deal with evasion attempts.  
 
This race between regulators and innovative evaders is also a defining feature of the financial 
sector. Destructive evasive entrepreneurship in the sub-prime security market contributed to 
the 2008 financial crisis as implicit government guarantees were exploited by assuming ex-
cessive risk (Calomiris 2009). Evasive entrepreneurship also caused institutions to change in 
this case, albeit in the other direction—making them more binding and comprehensive.  
3.4 Altering Entrepreneurship  
Baumol (1990) describes productive entrepreneurship solely in terms of private sector busi-
ness activity. However, other types of entrepreneurship can also be productive. Clearly, not all 
political activities can be defined as rent seeking; policy innovations often improve welfare, 
especially in favorable institutional environments. The National Science Foundation, for ex-
ample, was created in part through political entrepreneurship (Polsby 1984). Good institutions 
do not arise out of nowhere, and are often the result of policy entrepreneurship by gifted pi-
votal individuals. The productive political entrepreneur deserves recognition as a fundamental 
agent in the economy, just like the productive market entrepreneur. 
 
DiLorenzo (1988) emphasizes the unproductive and destructive activities of rent seeking po-
litical entrepreneurs, writing that ―[t]he essence of political entrepreneurship is to  destroy 
wealth through negative-sum rent-seeking behavior‖ (p. 66, italics in original). He maintains 
that ignoring political entrepreneurs has led public choice theorists to underestimate the de-
structive effects of politics. We conclude in turn that the focus on rent seeking has led to an 
underestimation of the total dynamic potential embodied in institutional change, both when 
channeled productively and unproductively/destructively. Both types of activities are carried 
out in modern developed democracies, sometimes concurrently, often leaving the observer to   12 
decide whether the policy innovation was productive or destructive (at least as long as the 
reform does not clearly violate Pareto efficiency). Wagner (1966) argues that political entre-
preneurs can substitute for the rent-seeking activities of large interest groups, which mitigates 
the  central  difficulties  in  overcoming  collective  action  problems  and  organizing  interest 
groups emphasized by Olson (1965).  
 
The incentive structure  guides the allocation of political  entrepreneurial  effort,  just as it 
guides the allocation of business entrepreneurship. All societies  enjoy a mix of incentives; 
political entrepreneurship is allocated to both productive and unproductive/destructive institu-
tional reform efforts, in analogy to other types of entrepreneurship. Baumol‘s (1990) broader 
theory of entrepreneurship holds true for political entrepreneurship in particular. While all 
three types take place in all societies, relative allocation can vary greatly, helping to determine 
the societies‘ level of welfare and rate of growth.  
 
The same individual may shift between categories, just as a business entrepreneur may intro-
duce a new product one year, and frivolously sue to bar competition the next. Barack Obama 
and other community organizers in the urban United States arguably engage in both produc-
tive political entrepreneurship (such as easing job searches in their community) and unproduc-
tive entrepreneurship (jockeying for city subsidies to their respective constituents, for exam-
ple). The broader rules of the game are not changed by these activities, even if certain pieces 
of legislation may change. While most political entrepreneurship does not hold enough clout 
to  fundamentally  alter the rules  of the game, there are examples  of entrepreneurship  that 
change institutions so much that the broader rules guiding other political entrepreneurs shift 
across categories. Some examples of this, such as Zimbabwe‘s leader Robert Mugabe, will be 
given later.  
 
Entrepreneurial activity in the market is governed by a strong feedback mechanism, namely 
profit and survival. Where institutions are productive, individuals with socially beneficial ac-
tivities make profits, thereby guiding entrepreneurial talent to inherently productive activities. 
Market entrepreneurship is particularly beneficial in a social sense as it can allocate resources 
in an efficient manner using profit and loss as a guide; where institutions are unproductive or 
destructive, individuals can become rich through activities that redistribute wealth, or that are 
purely predatory. The feedback mechanism is less powerful for political and institutional en-
trepreneurship,  however  (Glaeser  2005).  Politicians  can  hope  to  be  re-elected  or   13 
elected/appointed to higher office, but not all policy entrepreneurs are office holders, and the 
political reward mechanism is rather noisy. Singapore‘s national leader Lee Kuan Yew was 
rewarded for his social reforms with a long tenure, but so were Cuba‘s Fidel Castro and Zim-
babwe‘s Robert Mugabe. Constructive policy entrepreneurs are more often rewarded for good 
activity and punished for destructive reforms when the broader institutional setting is propi-
tious. The quality of the meta-institutions includes the norms, values and beliefs of the general 
public—better informed and more socially oriented voters are more likely to reward socially 
beneficial reforms (Caplan 2007, Strömberg 2004). Rudolf Giuliani‘s tenure as Mayor of New 
York (1994–2001) elevated him to national prominence, since the public perceived him as 
having responded to the needs of the city with successful reforms.  
 
Another, perhaps more controversial, conclusion is that market entrepreneurship is more like-
ly to be efficient and productive than policy entrepreneurship, precisely because of the weaker 
feedback mechanism of the latter.
12 Although both types of activities can be unproductive 
when the broader institutional setting is of low quality, weak feedback mechanisms  ensure 
that  policy entrepreneurship  may not  be directed in a prod uctive way even if the meta -
institutions are generally favorable. Furthermore, many barriers to political reform exist even 
in good institutional settings, including the need to mobilize a majority, whereas market inno-
vations enjoy lower barriers to entry. 
 
4. The Interaction between the Entrepreneur and Institutions 
Changes in institutions should take into account not only the direct response of entrepreneurs, 
but also the subsequent change of institutions through entrepreneurial feedback. This feed-
back may be direct or indirect. Indirect feedback occurs when policy makers or political en-
trepreneurs feel the need to change institutions due to the response of entrepreneurs to institu-
tions within the given framework. Examples of indirect feedback include the effects of eva-
sive entrepreneurship that weaken institutions (or their actual impact), a decline in productive 
entrepreneurship that forces institutional reform, or an increase in rent-seeking entrepreneur-
ship that reduces the legitimacy of free-market reform.  
 
Direct feedback includes changes in institutions by market entrepreneurs, such as transaction 
costs or protective technology. Thorstein Veblen argued that technological change results in 
                                                 
12 We owe this observation to an anonymous referee.    14 
new habits of life and thought, thus giving rise to new institutions (Walker 1977). When tech-
nology is introduced by entrepreneurs, this creates a link between entrepreneurship and insti-
tutions.
13 Yet Boettke and Leeson (2009) point to a different  way of altering institutions, 
namely  through  productive entrepreneurs‘  ―creation of protective technologies that  secure 
citizens‘ private property rights vis-à-vis one another‖. These activities are most important in 
weak institutional environments, such as in many third world countries. Entrepreneurs help 
improve institutions by creating private protection methods that restrict predation in the ab-
sence of a well-functioning government. These include private law and courts, private police 
protection, bilateral punishment schemes (for example ostracism), reputation mechanisms for 
multilateral punishment of dishonest conduct, and social norms and customs. An example of 
this process can be found in the informal, unwritten rules of commercial activity and private 
courts in tribal units in Africa. Hwang and Powell (2005) consider the creation of standards to 
guide the activities of organizations—itself a form of institution—as an entrepreneurial act. In 
his discussion of second-best institutions, Rodrik (2008) points out that Ghanaian firms find 
courts  too  costly  as  a  method  of  contract  enforcement.  Such  firms  have  relied  on  self-
organized measures of contract enforcement instead, namely relational contracting through 
personal relationships and repeated interactions.  
 
Political entrepreneurship obviously houses an endogenous component. Productive political 
entrepreneurship improves the quality of institutions, but only in such environments with in-
stitutions of high quality where political entrepreneurship is directed towards productive ac-
tivities in the first place. Conversely, political entrepreneurs in countries with low quality in-
stitutions are more likely to engage in rent-seeking activities, some of which likely to cause 
institutional quality to deteriorate even further. This mechanism forms the root of the so-
called curse of natural resources (e.g., Boschini et al. 2007). 
 
The interaction between institutions and entrepreneurship is not limited to political entrepre-
neurship. Productive market entrepreneurship can change the operating field and create new 
opportunities for political entrepreneurship. British institutions, for example, not only encour-
aged the Industrial Revolution, they adapted rapidly to the new technology and production 
methods introduced by market entrepreneurs. The same is true for the recent revolution in 
                                                 
13 Veblen himself did not emphasize the individual entrepreneur as a driver of technological change (Gurkan 
2005). Nevertheless, his thesis can be extended to entrepreneur-driven technological change in a rather 
straightforward manner.    15 
information and communications technology centered in the United States, which evolved in 
tandem with institutional changes pursued by politicians that aided the growth of the venture 
capital industry (Fenn et al. 1995, Gompers and Lerner 2004).  
 
These examples illustrate that abiding market entrepreneurship can be complementary to al-
tering political entrepreneurship, both increasing the scope of the other by creating new o p-
portunities. Traditional market entrepreneurship differs from other factors of production in the 
sense that the marginal product does not typically diminish in the supply of the factor. Addi-
tional capital competes with and generally lowers the marginal productivity of already exist-
ing capital. The same is true for additional labor. While entrepreneurs also compete with each 
other, entrepreneurship is distinct as a factor of production in that other people‘s innovations 
can pave the way for one‘s own innovations by creating further opportunities for new ven-
tures (Holcombe 2007).
14 As we see it, such complementarity may also be true for political 
and business entrepreneurship. There is no guarantee that opportunities created  by new re-
forms will be used solely for productive policy innovations. Productive market  innovations 
may lead to destructive political innovation, especially when the broader institutional setting 
is less geared towards socially beneficial activity. For example, surveillance technology d e-
veloped largely by entrepreneurial IT firms has been used to increase political oppression in 
countries such as Iran and China.  
 
The feedback between entrepreneurship and institutions can help explain the discontinuous 
nature of the dynamics of economic growth. This provides one possible explanation for the 
phenomenon that the economies of some countries long mired in stagnation suddenly take off, 
propelled by a virtuous cycle of entrepreneurship and institutional change. The breaking point 
of stagnation can be either reforms by political entrepreneurs that create opportunity for mar-
ket entrepreneurship, or technological change promoted by business entrepreneurs that in turn 
creates opportunity for productive political entrepreneurship. The growth and reform cycle 
continues as more market entrepreneurship raise s the possibility for  additional institutional 
reforms and political return, which leads to further growth and entrepreneurship.  
 
                                                 
14 In this sense entrepreneurial innovation is similar to knowledge and ideas in general, which are not generally 
believed to be characterized by diminishing returns to scale (Arrow 1962, Romer 1986, Lucas 1988).    16 
5. Examples from Recent History 
5.1 Productive and Destructive Policy Entrepreneurship in Singapore and Zim-
babwe 
Singapore‘s Lee Kuan Yew embodies an example of productive institutional entrepreneurship 
that dramatically increased productive business activity. Early in his life, he helped found a 
political party that eventually grew to be the largest in the city-state. He maintained cohesion 
and secured room for impressive reforms by forging political alliances in an ethnically frag-
mented country. From Singapore‘s independence in 1965 through 1990, Lee and his People's 
Action Party developed the unique set of pro-growth institutions in Singapore that would see 
the  isolated  and  resource-poor  country  grow  to  become  one  of  the  richest  in  the  world 
(Peebles and Wilson 2002). Singapore‘s soaring growth can be traced to both market entre-
preneurship and foreign direct investment by large public firms. This success further streng-
thened the evolution of institutions through increased legitimacy for capitalism and created a 
pro-reform constituency. As growth took off, new investments and business ventures created 
the opportunity for additional policy entrepreneurship, which was readily provided. Singapore 
illustrates how one policy entrepreneur can positively change the entire incentive structure of 
a society.  
 
Zimbabwe‘s Robert Mugabe, on the other hand, is the destructive equivalent of Lee Kuan 
Yew. His political entrepreneurship also changed the incentive structures of his country, al-
though in the opposite direction (Meredith, 2002). Zimbabwe‘s path to wealth suffered an 
about-face, shifting from production to destructive rent extraction. The entrepreneur behind 
this transformation—Robert Mugabe—became wealthy in the transformative process while 
his nation suffered. As Baumol pointed out in his original theory, there is no guarantee that an 
entrepreneur‘s wealth will be auspicious for society. Indeed, Mugabe‘s example allows us to 
point to what distinguishes our expanded theory from Baumol‘s own. In his theory, the insti-
tutional framework of Zimbabwe led an entrepreneur to act destructively for personal gain. In 
ours, the originally productive institutions of Zimbabwe were altered by the policy entrepre-
neur Mugabe. The incentives in the country changed as a result, with destructive entrepre-
neurship becoming the easiest path to wealth for thousands of Zimbabweans, whose predatory 
behavior also destroyed some of the wealth of the country; indeed, the successful occupation 
of a farm requires alertness, organizational power and risk-taking. Previously productive en-
trepreneurs were put out of business, and many left the country altogether. Zimbabwe illu-  17 
strates that destructive institutional entrepreneurship can be much more powerful than d e-
structive abiding entrepreneurship. 
5.2 Interaction of Political and Productive Entrepreneurship in China 
China‘s two-fold transition to a Socialist command economy and later back to one of the fast-
est growing countries in the world exemplifies some of the interactions between entrepreneur-
ship and institutions. China is a particularly interesting case since entrepreneurs have also 
been key agents in the more recent transition from Socialist planning. The move to a full-
blown Socialist regime after the Communist revolution in 1949 was a gradual process com-
pleted in 1956/57.
15 Step-by-step, private enterprise was circumscribed as more and more 
sectors were collectivized and government involvement in management was extended. In a 
first move taking place between 1949 and 1952, private financial institutions were nationa-
lized and private capital markets were shut down. The government began placing pr ocessing 
orders with private producers and took charge of  most resource allocation. Plans for produc-
tion and sales had to be approved by officials.  
 
Entrepreneurs were still allowed to engage on the market and respond to market signals, but 
the institutional reforms brought about far -reaching changes in  their operations. Entrepre-
neurial activity was reduced to a contest for  winning orders and escaping controls. At the 
same time, the system offered ample opportunities for officials in charge of processing orders 
and means of production to earn rents through corruption. The consequences for private firms 
and the economy as a whole were highly detrimental. In 1951, the government began to strike 
back at these so-called ―five evils‖: bribery of government officials, tax evasion, theft of state 
property, cheating on government contracts, and theft of economic information for speculative 
purposes. The blame was largely directed towards the private sector and resulted in an accele-
rated rate of collectivization and nationalization of resources. 
 
The Communist takeover radically changed China‘s institutional setup, with the new institu-
tions drastically decreasing incentives for productive entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs were 
forced to expend more effort on evasive activities. The new institutions also provided fertile 
soil for unproductive forms of entrepreneurship. Rents could be earned by competing for bu-
reaucratic positions  that functioned as  gatekeepers for licenses and  government  contracts. 
                                                 
15 Our account draws on Lu (1994, ch. 4), and Lewis and Teets (2009). 
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These changes legitimated demands for further institutional reforms. Radical Communist fac-
tions gained political power as private enterprise was blamed for the malfunctioning quasi -
Socialist economy. The increased power of these groups induced further changes in economic 
institutions. 
 
Soon enough, a political entrepreneur came to the aid of business entrepreneurship. After the 
death of Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping rose to power in 1978 and initiated reforms that e x-
tended the scope of private enterprise. The subsequent events illustrate the endogenous rela-
tionship between entrepreneurial activities and institutions. Unlike the transformation in the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe,  Deng‘s  reforms  were  far  from  wholesale  privatization 
(Heilman 2008). Rather, they opened small arenas for productive business entrepreneurship at 
first, sometimes abiding and sometimes evading. The initially small productive sector of the 
Chinese economy began to grow year by year through successful entrepreneurial ventures 
(Tsai 2006).  
 
One example of the role of the entrepreneur in the ensuing transformation of Chinese institu-
tions was the implementation of the practice of ―contract-production-to-household‖, which 
allocated land to households on a long-term basis and allowed farmers to retain profits. This 
practice was officially endorsed in 1983, but had already been widely adopted in practice. The 
former laws that had prohibited private profits from household farming had lost all practical 
relevance. Another example is the policy document enforced in 1981, which allowed limited 
private enterprise, with severe restrictions on the maximum number of employees (two em-
ployees and five apprentices). However, these limitations did little to constrict the size of pri-
vate firms, of which many grew well beyond the permitted size. By the end of 1986, an offi-
cial survey showed that a large number of firms had exceeded the stipulated limits. New insti-
tutional reforms in 1987/88 later granted these firms legitimate status. Lu (1994, p. 117) con-
cludes that ―the Chinese policy makers did not pre-design the boom of the private sector in 
the 1980s and the relating changes in institutions. In many cases, what happened was the offi-
cial adaptation to reforms initiated by private entrepreneurs.‖
  
 
Deng‘s small windows of productive entrepreneurship opened up the entire system in time. 
China‘s  new productive institutions  were  greatly  strengthened through  abiding productive 
ventures, and have now organically evolved from exceptions to the dominant institutions of 
Chinese society. As incentives changed, talented individuals shifted from government em-  19 
ployment or Communist Party careers to private enterprise (sometimes combining the two in a 
unique Chinese mix). Political support for productive activity grew as a larger part of the elite 
began to derive its income from these institutions. While business entrepreneurs were pr e-
sumably driven by a profit motive, the political class also had stronger incentives to support 
reform.
16 Without these feedback mechanisms it is unlikely that reform would have been so 
far-reaching.  
 
Daokui et al. (2006) argue that market entrepreneurs help improve institutions by starting a 
business venture, thereby contributing to the destruction of prevailing institutions that are un-
favorable to entrepreneurship. Apart from open advocacy of reforms and the private persua-
sion of politicians, they mention two other strategies. The first involves a business owner who 
claims that he represents a special case, and that exceptions should be made for him. Once a 
concession has been made, additional concessions are easier to obtain, eventually adding up to 
a de facto change in institutions. The other strategy requires one to circumvent regulations 
and, once a successful enterprise has been established, argue for an ex post modification. This 
type of entrepreneurship has, according to the authors, changed the institutional environment 
not only in China but also in other rapidly growing economies such as India and Vietnam. As 
observed by Gilley (2002), Chinese politicians appointed at the local level frequently have a 
background as former (or current) entrepreneurs.
17  
 
The Chinese experience also highlights the role of productive evasive entrepreneurship as an 
engine for institutional change. Although many of the Chinese institutions that imposed r e-
strictions on entrepreneurship were still in place in the mid-1970s, the political will to enforce 
such restrictions weakened under Deng Xiaoping, and the institutions were eventually phased 
out as attention waned. The risk of sanctions—and thereby the cost of evading the institutions 
in question—decreased significantly, enhancing productive entrepreneurial activity. This was 
                                                 
16 While our theory accounts for the behavior of business entrepreneurs and the actions of Chinese policy entre-
preneurs when the reform cycle took hold, we admittedly cannot account for Deng Xiaoping‘s initial reforms. 
This is taken as exogenous both in the Chinese case and in the case of Singapore and Lee Kuan Yew. Both Deng 
and Lee were in power long enough to witness the benefits of the reforms they initiated, so their behavior is at 
least not incongruent with welfare-maximizing entrepreneurship. But why did these leaders initiate successful 
policy reforms and not others? Trying to answer this question is outside the scope of this paper.  
 
17 Djankov et al. (2006) present evidence that Chinese entrepreneurs value political freedom significantly more 
than non-entrepreneurs. This suggests that entrepreneurs might be an important force in bringing about change in 
political institutions in the future as well.   20 
a cumulative process by which the costs of evading regulation fell to a level where the institu-
tions had lost all practical relevance, and in the end they were formally abolished. 
 
The Chinese experience also indicates that institutions can affect not only the direc tion of 
entrepreneurship, but also its total supply. It would be difficult to argue that the torrent of en-
trepreneurial business activity that has been unleashed during the last few years, transforming 
not only the Chinese but also the world economy, does  not represent an increase over pre-
vious levels. Even when taking into account rent seeking activity, evasion and political entre-
preneurship within the Communist party, China doubtlessly has more entrepreneurship in its 
current institutional framework than under pure Communism. 
5.3 A Vicious Cycle of Unproductive Entrepreneurship in Post-Transition  
Russia  
According to Åslund, Boone and Johnson (2002), post-Soviet Russia is locked in an ―under-
reform trap‖. Institutions that reward rent seeking more than productive activities dominate 
the economy, and political influence from the Russian private sector can often be traced to 
oligarchs (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005). This group consists of people from the former Soviet 
nomenclature who seized power over the companies they managed after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The oligarchs took advantage of the huge arbitrage opportunities created by partial 
reforms and the co-existence of regulated and quasi-market prices during the Gorbachev era.  
 
There is no denying that rising from virtually nothing to amassing billions in the era of reform 
required entrepreneurial talent. However, most activity was non-productive; wealth was gen-
erated by taking control over firms or plundering them rather than creating new value. Kalan-
taridis and Labrianidis (2004) argue that the most important group of entrepreneurs during the 
transition period were ―directors of the Socialist Era‖ who were ―individuals in positions of 
authority during the Socialist Era, who adapted successfully to change‖. While the allocation 
of entrepreneurs from a Socialist system to a free market system may seem dramatic, the 
move was modest seen through the framework of this paper. Largely unproductive entrepre-
neurship under the low-quality Soviet institutions moved to largely unproductive entrepre-
neurship in the only marginally less distortive institutions of the transition era.  
 
Unproductive entrepreneurship in Russia proved self-reinforcing, in at least two ways. For 
one, the legitimacy of free market capitalism was deeply damaged by the initial era of unpro-  21 
ductive entrepreneurship. Second, the current oligarchs continue to use their political power to 
defend the current system, exemplified by their takeover of the Russian Union of Industrial-
ists and Entrepreneurs. Slinko  et al. (2005) underscore the negative effect of the establish-
ment‘s political influence, finding that large firms with high political stakes can prevent entry 
of new firms. Aidis et al. (2008) show that Russia has less business entrepreneurship than 
other transition countries, and that Russian institutions provide advantages to insiders over 
new ventures. In comparison to other transition economies, Russian entrepreneurs face more 
corruption, higher official and unofficial start-up costs, higher tax rates, more bureaucracy, 
and weaker protection of property rights (Åslund et al. 2002). Contrasting Russia‘s current 
trap with the virtuous cycle of institutional reform and entrepreneurship in China makes for an 
interesting task, and may offer hints about how to escape a bad equilibrium.  
5.4 The Market Entrepreneur as Political Entrepreneur in Italy  
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi represents a conspicuous example of an individual 
who acted both as a business entrepreneur and as a political entrepreneur, profoundly affect-
ing institutions in both roles. Circumventing laws that only allowed Italian public television to 
broadcast nationally, he set up a system of local stations that broadcast the same programs 
simultaneously. In doing so, Berlusconi essentially created Italy‘s first private national televi-
sion network.
 Italian public television capitulated in due course, allowing free competition 
over the airwaves. This is a striking example of how evasive entrepreneurship can alter insti-
tutions.
18 On the one hand, the reform shows a form of productive entrepreneurship, simply 
because there was a demand for private entertainment television in Italy. On the other hand, 
Berlusconi‘s political exploitation of his private control over television networks has been 
deemed socially destructive by some observers, which complicates matters. Throughout his 
business career, Berlusconi has not shied away from using his political connection to extract 
rents and favors for himself. His case illustrates that political entrepreneurship can be both 
productive and unproductive at the same time.  
 
The story does not end there, however. Aided by his media empire, Berlusconi ventured into 
large-scale political entrepreneurship, shattering the previous Italian party system. The politi-
cal party he founded grew to be the largest one in the most recent Italian elections. By chang-
ing the election laws and arduously forming new alliances, he transformed Italy into what 
                                                 
18 Berlusconi‘s evasive entrepreneurship in media and other business arenas are widely suspected to have crossed 
the line to breaches of the law.    22 
resembles a two-party system. Berlusconi used his political power to dramatically alter Italian 
formal institutions in several more important dimensions, largely to aid his own private ven-
tures and to shield himself from legal action.  
 
Needless to say, Berlusconi is not only a mover of certain Italian institutions, but also a prod-
uct of the  country‘s broader institutional setting. More than other western countries, Italy 
combines rigid regulations with endemic evasion. Berlusconi‘s dual involvement in politics 
and business was aided by his early political connections, which are common for successful 
businessmen in contemporary Italy. While posterity will have to determine whether Berlusco-
ni‘s political entrepreneurship was largely productive or destructive, his case illustrates with-
out a doubt that entrepreneurs are not only influenced by the institutional setting, but can 
shape institutions themselves.  
5.5 Welfare State Entrepreneurship in Sweden  
The Swedish example illustrates several venues of interaction between institutions and entre-
preneurship. Unlike other examples, high level of wealth produced by entrepreneurship did 
not initially lead to a virtuous cycle of further institutional improvements, instead funding a 
welfare state that was detrimental to market entrepreneurship. In addition, and perhaps partial-
ly in lieu of private sector innovativeness and talent, Sweden offered a well-functioning polit-
ical system amenable to political entrepreneurship. Because of the responsiveness of political 
entrepreneurship to diminished market entrepreneurship, the institutional environment was 
ultimately reformed to become more favorable for market entrepreneurs.  
 
Between 1870 and 1970 Sweden enjoyed a fertile institutional climate for market entrepre-
neurship, which resulted in the second highest growth rate in the world over that century 
(Maddison 1982). Based on this wealth, Social-Democratic Sweden implemented policies in 
the post-war period that eroded the accumulation of private wealth, private ownership of the 
business sector and, ultimately, productive business entrepreneurship. As Henrekson and Ja-
kobsson (2001) show, tax and industrial policies moved the economy towards larger business 
entities and institutional rather than individual ownership. Tax policy created a large wedge 
between wealth accumulation at the corporate and individual levels, thereby benefiting large 
incumbent firms over new entrants and individual entrepreneurs.
19 Export firms, often initially 
                                                 
19 The actual effects of these policies on such variables as the size distribution of firms and employment and the 
industry distribution of production and employment are documented in Davis and Henrekson (1997).    23 
founded by individual entrepreneurs, had by this time grown  into large public companies, 
providing the economic base of the welfare state. The major incumbent owners managed to 
retain control despite this large wedge through a growing disparity between control rights and 
cash-flow rights. A number of devices were used to achieve this, the most important of which 
were dual-class shares and pyramiding with tax-favored closed-end investment funds as the 
prime control vehicle. By the late 1980s, it became apparent that higher taxes and such intru-
sions in market mechanisms had taken a heavy toll on economic growth and productive busi-
ness entrepreneurship. Virtually all the fifty largest firms in Sweden in the year 2000 were 
founded before 1970 (Henrekson 2005). The lack of productive business entrepreneurship has 
been called ―the Achilles heel of the Swedish welfare state‖ (Högfeldt 2005). 
 
A balanced history of the welfare state should account for its successes and failures at one and 
the same time. As productive business entrepreneurship was hampered in Sweden, a corres-
ponding  increase  in  unproductive  entrepreneurship  did  not  occur,  in  contrast  to  what  the 
Baumol (1990) framework would suggest. Sweden‘s political institutions worked reasonably 
well throughout the era, with little evidence of rent seeking. One interpretation could take up 
the stifling, long-run effects of Social Democratic institutions on the total supply of entrepre-
neurship, which led to a decrease in productive entrepreneurship but no corresponding in-
crease in unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship.
20 Aside from a decrease in total entr e-
preneurship,  political entrepreneurship  also rose. However, in contrast to what Baumol ‘s 
theory would predict, this political entrepreneurship was not unproductive. Rather, Sweden 
channeled much of its innovative energy of this period into welfare state entrepreneurship, 
pioneering policies that were later adopted by other countries (Pontusson 2005). This includes 
the health care system, social insurance, active labor market programs and the care of children 
and the elderly. The political system was attentive to the changing needs of industry (Steinmo 
2010). In addition, there was a myriad of policies at the municipal level aimed at producing 
local public goods. Much of the country‘s talent that would have otherwise gone to the private 
sector was drawn into the public sector. Talented individuals, including Nobel laureates, were 
attracted to the creation of the new system and helped design and improve the welfare state.  
 
A public sector as large and intrusive as the Swedish one would not have functioned without a 
focus on mitigating incentive problems as much as possible (Freeman et al. 1997, Lindert 
                                                 
20 However, evasive entrepreneurship increased somewhat, especially with the aim of evading high taxes and 
onerous labor market regulations.    24 
2004). In order to ensure high labor force participation despite punitive tax levels, participat-
ing in the labor force became a requirement for access to many highly subsidized services and 
transfers (Lindbeck 1982). Furthermore, women‘s participation was encouraged by subsidiz-
ing consumption complementary to work. The system was responsive above all. Government 
programs were continuously reformed in order to maintain economic performance. Social 
insurance programs whose generosity was being exploited were often quickly reformed. In 
many ways the Swedish system outperformed others, not necessarily in an absolute sense, but 
compared to the likely outcome in other countries had they ventured this far in expanding the 
welfare state. Continental European countries such as France and Belgium with lower taxes 
have fewer hours worked than Sweden. Recent research on taxes and hours worked in Europe 
has identified Sweden and other similar Scandinavian countries as positive ―outliers‖ in the 
relationship between taxation and work, a fact attributed to the unique design of public spend-
ing programs aimed at mitigating the problems caused by the high levels of taxation (Roger-
son 2007). 
 
The high degree of productive political entrepreneurship in the Swedish system became most 
apparent as the problems of the welfare state grew in its mature phase. The country responded 
by rolling back some of the most far-reaching reform programs in history (Bergh and Er-
lingsson 2009, Steinmo 2010). This included a fundamental tax reform, financial deregula-
tion, restructuring of macroeconomic policy, reduction of the generosity of social insurance 
programs, transformation of the pension system, and modification of labor market policies. 
While we do not want to push the story too hard—many problems remain in the Swedish 
economy, in particular a high level of non-employment in marginal groups—Sweden‘s adap-
tive responsiveness has contained a high degree of productive political entrepreneurship. As a 
result, room for business entrepreneurship has also increased. Most of the underlying prin-
ciples of the welfare state were maintained, but the system became much more favorable for 
productive business entrepreneurship.  
 
This showcases another aspect of the interaction between institutions and entrepreneurship. 
When the institutions that guide politics and political entrepreneurship are of sufficient quali-
ty, the political system will have a highly elastic supply of productive policy entrepreneurship. 
In such an environment, the institutions that regulate market activity are unlikely to be al-
lowed to evolve in too detrimental a fashion. The welfare state institutions were bounded by   25 
their impact on the supply of business entrepreneurship, and ultimately reformed in order to 
stimulate the supply of new rapidly growing firms again.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper expands on the framework introduced by Baumol (1990). Entrepreneurship is not 
only shaped by institutions, it also influences institutions in turn. On the one hand, entrepre-
neurs choose how to employ their entrepreneurial talent depending on the relevant incentive 
structure as determined by the pertinent institutions. In this way, institutions fundamentally 
determine  the  distribution  across  productive,  unproductive  and  destructive  entrepreneurial 
activities. On the other hand, entrepreneurs respond actively to the environment they face, 
which tends to affect institutions.  
 
Since these types of activities all involve a measure of innovation, politicians cannot fully 
anticipate these effects when designing institutions. Our analysis highlights the need to view 
the formation of institutions as an adaptive process. Politicians cannot design optimal institu-
tions once and for all; unpredictable entrepreneurial responses to these institutions will force 
them to respond by continually changing and amending the institutional environment. Re-
search on the political economy of entrepreneurship cannot be restricted to analyzing how 
institutions affect the level and type of entrepreneurial activity. It is also necessary to consider 
how  entrepreneurial  activities  affect  institutions  and  thereby  the  prospects  for  long-term 
growth. Institutional changes aimed at promoting entrepreneurship must always be evaluated 
with respect to what kind of entrepreneurship is promoted. A tax hike may not only deter pro-
ductive entrepreneurs, but also encourage unproductive entrepreneurship. 
 
Finally, it is worth asking whether altering political entrepreneurship can change the alloca-
tion of political entrepreneurship. Most political entrepreneurship is too insignificant to palp-
ably change the broader incentive structures. The allocation and lucrativeness of policy entre-
preneurship itself changes, however, either through comprehensive acts of reform by single 
policy  entrepreneurs  or  through  slow  incremental  change.  In  terms  of  contemporary  pro-
tracted reform, various reform-minded policy entrepreneurs are slowly bringing the old statist 
system to an end. An example of more radical change is the promise to stifle lobbying in the 
United States (not yet realized at the time of writing). Such an act of large-scale policy entre-
preneurship could change institutions enough to alter the allocation of multitudes of smaller   26 
scale policy entrepreneurship, presumably reducing unproductive political entrepreneurship. 
There would be positive multipliers associated with this reform due to the mechanisms we 
have pointed to. Not only would unproductive lobbying be reduced, in addition some of the 
entrepreneurial resources could be redirected to business entrepreneurship or more productive 
political entrepreneurship. Perhaps some of these activities would someday in turn lead to 
additional institutional improvements. The gains from channeling entrepreneurship into pro-
ductive use is thus larger than a narrow look at the market activity would suggest, and larger 
still due to (by its nature) hard-to-anticipate improvements in institutions.   
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